



## Liquidity provision: Normal times vs Crashes

Ravi Jagannathan, Lorian Pelizzon, Ernst Schaumburg, Mila Getmansky Sherman,  
and Darya Yuferova

*10th Emerging Markets Finance Conference · Mumbai · 12 December, 2019*



# Motivation

## Handa and Schwartz (1996)

“Investors want three things from the markets: liquidity, liquidity, and liquidity.”

## Levine (2005)

A liquid and stable stock market promotes economic growth.

## The “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010...

- ▶ questions the stability of the financial markets
- ▶ and draws regulators attention to the liquidity provision process.



# Motivation

## Handa and Schwartz (1996)

“Investors want three things from the markets: liquidity, liquidity, and liquidity.”

## Levine (2005)

A liquid and stable stock market promotes economic growth.

## The “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010...

- ▶ questions the stability of the financial markets
- ▶ and draws regulators attention to the liquidity provision process.

**Are liquidity providers during normal times different from liquidity providers during crashes?**



## Preview of the results

- ▶ Short-term traders are the main liquidity providers during normal times.
- ▶ During crashes, short-term traders do not have enough capacity to stabilize the market.
- ▶ Well-capitalized standby liquidity providers like mutual funds are needed to provide liquidity during crashes, but it takes time for them to move in.




# Data

- ▶ Tick-by-tick order level data from National Stock Exchange of India
- ▶ Sample: Large anonymous firm
- ▶ Period: April-June, 2006 (includes both normal periods and two crash days)
- ▶ Markets: spot and single-stock futures
- ▶ No algorithmic trading allowed
- ▶ **Trader IDs and legal classification**



# Traders Classification





# Activity of different traders

	Active on spot market only		Active on both markets	
	# of traders	% of trading volume	# of traders	% of trading volume
<b>Panel A: Spot market</b>				
LTT	1,471	15.7%	219	6.7%
FII	107	5.5%	20	1.7%
MF	262	3.6%	6	0.1%
OLTT	1,102	6.6%	193	4.9%
STT	5,597	25.4%	950	35.6%
Small	90,646	16.3%	513	0.2%
<b>Panel B: Futures market</b>				
LTT	6,613	27.2%	219	3.9%
FII	40	0.9%	20	1.0%
MF	9	0.1%	6	0.0%
OLTT	6,564	26.2%	193	2.8%
STT	19,574	39.0%	950	28.6%
Small	5,628	1.2%	513	0.1%



# Activity of different traders

	Active on spot market only		Active on both markets	
	# of traders	% of trading volume	# of traders	% of trading volume
<b>Panel A: Spot market</b>				
LTT	1,471	15.7%	219	6.7%
FII	107	5.5%	20	1.7%
MF	262	3.6%	6	0.1%
OLTT	1,102	6.6%	193	4.9%
<b>STT</b>	<b>5,597</b>	<b>25.4%</b>	<b>950</b>	<b>35.6%</b>
Small	90,646	16.3%	513	0.2%
<b>Panel B: Futures market</b>				
LTT	6,613	27.2%	219	3.9%
FII	40	0.9%	20	1.0%
MF	9	0.1%	6	0.0%
OLTT	6,564	26.2%	193	2.8%
<b>STT</b>	<b>19,574</b>	<b>39.0%</b>	<b>950</b>	<b>28.6%</b>
Small	5,628	1.2%	513	0.1%





# Activity of different traders

	Active on spot market only		Active on both markets	
	# of traders	% of trading volume	# of traders	% of trading volume
<b>Panel A: Spot market</b>				
LTT	1,471	15.7%	219	6.7%
FII	107	5.5%	20	1.7%
MF	262	3.6%	6	0.1%
OLTT	1,102	6.6%	193	4.9%
STT	5,597	25.4%	950	35.6%
Small	90,646	16.3%	513	0.2%
<b>Panel B: Futures market</b>				
LTT	6,613	27.2%	219	3.9%
FII	40	0.9%	20	1.0%
MF	9	0.1%	6	0.0%
OLTT	6,564	26.2%	193	2.8%
STT	19,574	39.0%	950	28.6%
Small	5,628	1.2%	513	0.1%



## Liquidity provision during normal times

### STTs are the main liquidity providers during normal times based on...

- ▶ Position in the trading network.
- ▶ Market-making index (Comerton-Forde, Malinova and Park (2018) and Korajczyk and Murphy (2019)).
- ▶ Contribution to the limit order book.



## Liquidity provision during normal times

### STTs are the main liquidity providers during normal times based on...

- ▶ Position in the trading network.
- ▶ Market-making index (Comerton-Forde, Malinova and Park (2018) and Korajczyk and Murphy (2019)).
- ▶ Contribution to the limit order book.



## Liquidity provision during normal times

STTs are the main liquidity providers during normal times based on...

- ▶ Position in the trading network.
- ▶ Market-making index (Comerton-Forde, Malinova and Park (2018) and Korajczyk and Murphy (2019)).
- ▶ Contribution to the limit order book.



## Liquidity provision during normal times

STTs are the main liquidity providers during normal times based on...

- ▶ Position in the trading network.
- ▶ Market-making index (Comerton-Forde, Malinova and Park (2018) and Korajczyk and Murphy (2019)).
- ▶ Contribution to the limit order book.




## Identification of crashes

- ▶ Using drift-burst, developed by Christensen, Oomen and Renò (2016) and also used in Bellia, Christensen, Kolokolov, Pelizzon and Renò (2018).
- ▶ Using intuitive rule: greater than 3% drop in 15 minutes followed by greater than 3% recovery in 15 minutes.
- ▶ Both methods identify the same two crashes.




# Two crash days

## 19th of May 2006



## 22nd of May 2006





# Liquidity provision during crashes

- ▶ Different measures for liquidity provision during normal times vs crashes
  - ▶ Limit order book changes fast
  - ▶ Traders who provide liquidity will be buying rather than selling
- ▶ Liquidity provision during crashes = the trading volume in the opposite direction of the price decline.





# The role of STTs as in Kirilenko et al. (2017)

$\Delta Inv$	STT Spot	STT Futures
Return	69.02** (2.07)	-235.59** (-2.44)
Down*Return	-274.02** (-2.53)	161.79 (0.63)
Up*Return	-111.07** (-2.50)	3.38 (0.02)
Down	3.26** (2.44)	5.95** (1.99)
Up	-0.35 (-0.33)	-3.76** (-2.19)
Constant	-0.57 (-1.63)	-0.98 (-1.22)
Observations	1,909	1,909
Adjusted $R^2$	0.162	0.099
Day and Time FE	Yes	Yes
Robust SE	Yes	Yes




# The role of STTs as in Kirilenko et al. (2017)

$\Delta Inv$	STT Spot	STT Futures
Return	69.02** (2.07)	-235.59** (-2.44)
Down*Return	-274.02** (-2.53)	161.79 (0.63)
Up*Return	-111.07** (-2.50)	3.38 (0.02)
Down	3.26** (2.44)	5.95** (1.99)
Up	-0.35 (-0.33)	-3.76** (-2.19)
Constant	-0.57 (-1.63)	-0.98 (-1.22)
Observations	1,909	1,909
Adjusted $R^2$	0.162	0.099
Day and Time FE	Yes	Yes
Robust SE	Yes	Yes




# The role of STTs: Inventory capacity breached on crash days

## Spot market




## Futures market






# FIIs caused the crash

## 19th May




## 22nd May






# MFs helped recovery

## 19th May



## 22nd May





# The role of MFs and FIs: Granger causality on crash days

- ▶ Spot market
  - ▶ Order flow from MFs and FIs Granger-causes returns.
  - ▶ Returns do not Granger-cause order flow from MFs and FIs.
- ▶ Futures market
  - ▶ Order flow from MFs and FIs does not Granger-cause returns.
  - ▶ Returns do not Granger-cause order flow from MFs.



# Conclusion

- ▶ STTs are the main liquidity providers during normal times.
- ▶ Well-capitalized standby liquidity providers like MFs are needed to provide liquidity during crashes.
  - ▶ MFs are slow to move in.
  - ▶ It takes time to understand the reasons for the crash.
  - ▶ MFs may also require a large price concession.
  - ▶ Circuit breakers provide extra time, but not necessarily the monetary incentives.



# Thank you

Thank you very much for your attention!



## References I

- Bellia, M., Christensen, K., Kolokolov, A., Pelizzon, L. and Renò, R. (2018). High-frequency trading during flash crashes: Walk of fame or hall of shame?, *Working Paper* .
- Christensen, K., Oomen, R. C. and Renò, R. (2016). The drift burst hypothesis, *Working paper* .
- Comerton-Forde, C., Malinova, K. and Park, A. (2018). Regulating dark trading: Order flow segmentation and market quality, *Journal of Financial Economics* **130**(2): 347–366.
- Handa, P. and Schwartz, R. A. (1996). How best to supply liquidity to a securities market, *Journal of Portfolio Management* **22**(2): 44–51.
- Kirilenko, A. A., Kyle, A. S., Samadi, M. and Tuzun, T. (2017). The Flash Crash: The impact of high frequency trading on an electronic market, *Journal of Finance* **72**(3): 967–998.
- Korajczyk, R. A. and Murphy, D. (2019). High frequency market making to large institutional trades, *Review of Financial Studies* **32**(3): 1034–1067.
- Levine, R. (2005). Finance and growth: Theory and evidence, *Handbook of Economic Growth* **1**: 865–934.