Do Economic Conditions Drive DIP Lending?: Evidence from the Financial Crisis

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. DIP Loan Terms:

Pricing

Loan Covenants

Extraordinary Provisions

Roll-ups

Milestones

→ All-in-Spread (AIS)

Reporting
Periodic updates to lender
Two most common:

Cash reporting
Budget reporting



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achiev

> filing

l. DIP Loan Terms:

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Roll-ups

Milestones

Use DIP Loan to pay off DIP lender's pre-bkr claim

- > Ordinarily, claims get paid only at end of case,
 - > And not in cash, but in promises.
- Roll-up cashes out pre-bkr claim with sure-to-berepaid DIP loan
- Potentially bad consequences:
 - 1. Eliminates reorg risk for DIP lender's pre-bkr claim
 - 2. Can't pay with promises
 - 3. Larger exit financing burden
 - 4. May take value from junior claimants
- courr approvai or completion of major asset sale



II. **Eithaliogs**n Terms:

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Increased during Credit Crunch

More stringent reporting (frequency) with credit scarcity,

for both budget and cash reporting

Use of extraordinary provisions bore no relation to credit availability.




- III. Data and Sample
 - A. Sample Cases: Lopucki BRD (2004-12)
 - B. Case files: PACER
 - C. Coding DIP loan arrangements for covenants/ other loan terms roll-ups
 - D. All-in-spread: Thomson Reuters DealScan
 - E. Domestic credit level: BIS, CHY

Total DIP amount Case milestones




IV. Empirical Analysis: Background





IV. Empirical Analysis: Credit Market Effects


Early '08: **Bear Stearns**sold to JPMC



Sep '08: **Lehman** files; Fed takes over **AIG**, **FM**, **FM**




IV. Empirical Analysis: Credit Market Effects





IV. Empirical Analysis: DIP Loan Pricing







IV. Empirical Analysis: DIP Loan Pricing

TABLE 2 DIP LOAN PRICING AND AVAILABLE CREDIT				
		(1) (2) All-in-Spread Above LIBOR		
Credit (%)	-70.66***	-52.16***		
	(1,874)	(1,911)		
Ргераск	-42.79	-53.65		
	(66.41)	(69.39)		
363 Sale	38.50	71.11		
	(62.93)	(97.60)		
Ln(Assets)	2.044	-11.92		
	(22.05)	(29.30)		
Leverage	302.8	327.7		
	(451.4)	(438.6)		
Num. Covenants		2.892		
		(18.00)		
Disc. St. Milestone		100.9		
		(124.1)		
Plan Milestone		24.42		
		(124.0)		
Sale Milestone		3.262		
		(117.7)		
Rollup/Claim		-0.886		
		(0.694)		
Constant	191.6	294.8		
	(485.6)	(491.2)		
Industry FE	Yes	Yes		
Observations	100	90		
R-squared	0.199	0.275		



IV. Empirical Analysis: Reporting Covenants








IV. Empirical Analysis: Reporting Covenants

	(1) (2)		
	Budget Reporting Frequency	Cash Reporting Frequency	
G - 11 - 0 C	0.504	0.004	
Credit (%)	8.69*	9.22*	
Luron a all	(4.96)	(5.37)	
Ртераск	(0.19)	(0.20)	
363 Sale	-0.24	-0.03	
303 Saic	(0.19)	(0.21)	
Ln(Assets)	0.11	0.12	
DII(1133Ct3)	(0.07)	(0.10)	
Leverage	-0.78	0.48	
Ec vorage	(1.30)	(1.31)	
Num. Fin. Covenants	-0.03	-0.09	
	(0.07)	(0.08)	
Disc. St. Milestone	-0.26	-0.17	
	(0.28)	(0.36)	
Plan Milestone	0.42*	-0.04	
	(0.23)	(0.33)	
Sale Milestone	-0.06	0.01	
	(0.2)	(0.20)	
Rollup/Claim	0.00	0.00*	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Constant	2.45	1.29	
	(1.55)	(1.51)	
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	
Observations	149	145	
R-squared	0.171	0.141	



IV. Empirical Analysis: Roll-ups (Chart)





IV. Empirical Analysis: Roll-ups (Regression)

	(1) Roll-up	(2) Roll-up	(3) Roll-up/	(4) Roll-up/
	Dummy	Value	Claim	DIP
	•			
Credit (%)	2.48	1,445	365.6	2.54
	(2.52)	(946.5)	(242.6)	(1.64)
Ртераск	0.05	-45.61	4.40	-0.00
	(0.10)	(33.30)	(9.25)	(0.06)
363 Sale	-0.02	34.33	-9.71	-0.05
	(0.11)	(50.07)	(9.74)	(0.07)
Ln(Assets)	-0.02	123.6**	-4.63	-0.03
	(0.04)	(58.17)	(3.38)	(0.02)
Leverage	0.38	-332.8*	-2.78	0.46
	(0.67)	(198.2)	(71.62)	(0.46)
Num. Covenants	0.05*	17.89	5.20*	0.035*
	(0.03)	(11.05)	(3.13)	(0.02)
Disc. St. Milestone	0.10	75.74	-8.52	0.07
	(0.13)	(67.02)	(13.97)	(0.09)
Plan Milestone	-0.09	1.538	5.38	-0.02
	(0.11)	(44.81)	(11.28)	(0.08)
Sale Milestone	0.25**	-20.21	23.76**	0.21***
	(0.12)	(42.98)	(10.61)	(0.08)
Constant	0.25	-425.8	76.10	0.03
	(0.78)	(430.9)	(78.08)	(0.53)
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	158	158	155	155
R-squared	0.20	0.23	0.23	0.23



IV. Empirical Analysis: Extraordinary Provisions--Milestones

MILESTONES	AND AVAIL	ABLE CREDIT
TATELD I OTTED		

	Available Credit (%)	Disclosure Statement Milestone	Plan Milestone	Sale Milestone	Any Milestone
Available Credit (%)	1				
Discl Stmt Milestone	-0.05	1			
	(p<.50)				
Plan Milestone	-0.07	0.70***	1		
	(p<.36)	(p<.00)			
Sale Milestone	0.09	-0.04	-0.09	1	
	(p<.28)	(p<.59)	(p<.27)		
Any Milestone	-0.01	0.59	0.74	0.47	1
	(p<0.87)	(p<.00)	(p<.00)	(p<.00)	



V. Conclusion

Ordinary loan terms respond to economic conditions.

DIP loan pricing and reporting frequencies increase with credit scarcity.

Re extraordinary provisions:

- Incidence of roll-ups and milestones showed no relation to credit market changes.
- So no evidence to support the credit market rationale for use of extraordinary provisions.
- Conjecture that roll-ups and milestones became part of the status quo pre-Crisis.
 - Merely continued through the Crisis.
- > Ongoing research:
 - > Focus on term loan rollups (working capital rollups may be harmless).

