

Firm heterogeneity in foreign investors under stress

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Part I

Motivation

Motivation

- Policymakers in developing countries have important concerns over capital account liberalisation.
- What foreign investors do on most days is not interesting.
- The real concerns are about extreme days.

Questions at the aggregative level

- 1 Are foreign investors fair weather friends?
- 2 Are foreign investors big fish in a small pond?
- 3 Are foreign investors calm and rational?
- 4 Do foreign investors respond differently to good and bad days?
- 5 Are foreign investors vectors of crisis transmission from world markets to domestic markets?

Previous work

Foreign Investors under Stress: Evidence from India, in *International Finance*, 2013. Results:

Responses of FIIs to extreme events Positive feedback trading by FII; vector of transmission of good news from abroad but not the other way around.

Statistically significant but small effects.

Consequences of FII extreme days None.

Implementation is in the R package 'eventstudies'.

Identifying the impact of foreign investment flows upon stock prices, Muley & Shah, WP, 2016. Results: No causal impact.

Questions at the firm level

- 1 Does the tail behaviour of FII's vary across firms?
- 2 Acute asymmetric information with smaller stocks kicks off a different kind of behaviour there?
- 3 Do foreign investors think that investing in small firms is akin to FDI?

Implications for firms

- The old prescription for firms is: It is good to overcome home bias as this generally gives you a lower cost of capital.
- Perhaps there is a dark side to this. Perhaps small firms experience problems when FII's come in, owing to high asymmetric information.

Part II

Data

Data construction

- FII transaction data, daily, from SEBI. From 2003 on, for around 3307 firms. Express net buy of the day as basis points of market cap.
- Returns, and market capitalisation, data from the CMIE ProwessDX database.
- Impact cost data from the NSE data at IGIDR FRG.

Sample selection

- There are 3307 firms in which FIIs invested over the course of 12 years.
- 710 firms contain 99% of the activity.
- Difficulties in database linking take us to 543 firms.

Part III

Methodology

Key ideas

- How to identify extreme events? Focus on tail events; extreme movements in returns. For individual stocks, shift from returns to augmented market model residuals.
- How to identify impact? Treat tail events as a shock, and use an event study to measure the impact.

This is non-causal. What we are seeing are correlations.

Clustered events

- It is possible to have extreme event dates as a cluster. Two possibilities arise:
 - ① Very high (or, low) returns may occur on consecutive days.
 - ② Mixed returns may occur on consecutive days.
- We handle the first type by fusing the cluster and treating them as a single event. This allows us to avoid losing observations.
- We handle the second type by identifying these events and discarding them from our analysis.

Bootstrap Inference Strategy

- Suppose there are N events. Each event is expressed as a time-series of cumulative returns (CR) in event time, within the event window. The overall summary statistic of interest is \overline{CR} , the average of all the CR time-series.
- We do sampling with replacement at the level of the events. For each event, its corresponding CR time-series is taken. This yields a time-series \overline{CR} , which is one draw from the distribution of the statistic.
- This procedure is repeated 1000 times in order to obtain the full distribution of \overline{CR} . This gives us the confidence intervals for our estimates.


Part IV

Results

Distribution of events

Extreme return movements


Distribution of extreme events across months




- 1 We have 25320 good firm events. These are evenly distributed across the time period of our study.
- 2 We have 25051 bad firm events. These are fairly distributed across the time period, albeit with some concentration in GFC.

Average behaviour across all firms

Event study plots: All extreme return events



(a) Bad events



(b) Good events


- FII's did not have any a-priori information of negative days.
- FII's are positive feedback traders after good days.

Heterogeneity by liquidity


- Two main liquidity measures:
 - ① **Amihud's illiquidity measure:** Ratio of absolute value of return to the rupee trading volume (Lower ratio \implies Higher liquidity)
 - ② **Turnover ratio:** Ratio of number of shares traded to the total outstanding shares (Higher ratio \implies Higher liquidity)
- We split the data into five quintiles and perform event study on each of the quintiles.
- Q1 is the most liquid quintile and Q5 is the least liquid quintile.

FII response to extreme +ve stock returns (1,2,3)


Event study plots: Quintile-wise analysis



(a) Quintile 1 (High)




(b) Quintile 2




(c) Quintile 3

FII response to extreme +ve stock returns (4,5)

Event study plots: Quintile-wise analysis (Contd.)




(a) Quintile 4




(b) Quintile 5 (Low)

FII response to extreme -ve returns (1,2,3)


Event study plots: Quintile-wise analysis



(a) Quintile 1 (High)




(b) Quintile 2




(c) Quintile 3

FII response to extreme -ve returns (4,5)

Event study plots: Quintile-wise analysis (Contd.)



(a) Quintile 4




(b) Quintile 5 (Low)

An alternative measure of liquidity


- Impact cost (IC) represents the cost of executing a transaction in a given stock, for a specific predefined order size, at any given point of time.
- It is closer to the true cost of execution faced by a trader in comparison to the bid-ask spread.
- Data on buy and sell IC is available from July-12 to Feb-17 for all the stocks.
- We find the IC by taking the average of buy and sell IC for each stock on each transaction size.
- We find the median IC and divide the stocks into liquidity quintiles, similar to earlier liquidity analysis (Lower IC \implies Higher liquidity).
- Next, we perform a robustness check for quintile wise analysis with a smaller data set from July-12 to Nov-15 with three liquidity measures: Amihud's measure, Turnover ratio and Impact cost.

FII response to +ve extreme returns (1,2,3)


Event study plots: Quintile-wise analysis



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
(b) Quintile 2




(c) Quintile 3

FII response to +ve extreme returns (4,5)

Event study plots: Quintile-wise analysis




(a) Quintile 4




(b) Quintile 5 (Low)

FII response to +ve extreme returns (1,2,3)


Event study plots: Quintile-wise analysis



(a) Quintile 1 (High)




(b) Quintile 2




(c) Quintile 3

FII response to +ve extreme returns (4,5)

Event study plots: Quintile-wise analysis



(a) Quintile 4



(b) Quintile 5 (Low)

Part V

Conclusion

What have we learned?

- The FII response to extreme news about a firm is very sensitive to firm liquidity.
- With extreme +ve days, they are positive feedback traders, strongly with liquid stocks and weakly with illiquid stocks.
- They shrug off extreme -ve days for liquid stocks.
- They buy after extreme -ve days for illiquid stocks.

Thank you.