

Extreme Actions of Incumbent CEOs To Frustrate Hostile Takeover Bids

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
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8th Emerging Market Finance Conference
Mumbai, INDIA, December 17-20, 2017

Empirical Setup of the Paper



Some Observations – Methodological

- Definition of extreme/frustrating actions: actions that make targets less valuable and more difficult to acquire
 - short run and long run effect of extreme actions → does the RNS classification take account of this?
 - does this definition presupposes the outcome?
 - motivation is still an interesting question
- Other actions: the complement of extreme actions
 - what are the objectives of the other actions
 - are these actions then “non-hostile” and then the choice is between extreme actions and all other actions? (53 versus 632 + 77)
- Can we compare extreme actions in hostile takeovers in UK and US
 - effect in US should be stronger as statutes already incorporate takeover defence in firm charter
- Relatedly it means that selection bias is less of an issue in the UK which is consistent with the results
- Should we set the dummy variable to one for successful extreme actions (i.e. those that were able to actually frustrate the potential acquirer) and not all extreme actions?

Some Observations – Empirical

- Should both the equations be estimated simultaneously rather than in two steps?
- If in two steps then should one have the estimated probability of frustrating actions rather than the variable itself in the outcome regressions?
- Should the selection equation for hostile takeover also have the CG variables and especially those related to CEO power as that was the motivation of the selection model?
- Table 2: It will be informative to have this table for non-hostile and hostile takeovers and within that for successful and failed attempts
- The interaction term “frustrating action x failed attempt” should be used consistently in all regressions
- Some coefficients, e.g. Cadbury Dummy (> 0); Incumbent CEO Stock Ownership (> 0) have alternative interpretations that do NOT support the hypothesis of CEO power

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- Enjoyed reading the paper and hope to see it being published