

# The proposed regulatory framework for pre-paid payment instruments

Finance Research Group  
IGIDR

June 14, 2017

# Why do we care about pre-paid payment products?

- Relatively slower growth.

	UPI	PPI	IMPS	PoS Terminals	Mobile banking
Volume	13.21%	0.54%	1.06%	-3.41%	-1.54%
Value	7.29%	1.51%	3.43%	-2.69%	4.59%

Average m-o-m growth (January - May 2017)

# Why do we care about pre-paid payment products?

- Relatively slower growth.

	UPI	PPI	IMPS	PoS Terminals	Mobile banking
Volume	13.21%	0.54%	1.06%	-3.41%	-1.54%
Value	7.29%	1.51%	3.43%	-2.69%	4.59%

Average m-o-m growth (January - May 2017)

- But, second largest share in small value payment transactions.

	UPI	PPI	IMPS	PoS Terminals	Mobile banking	Large value systems
Volume	0.48%	10.03%	7.17%	30.5%	7.46%	44.36%
Value	0.02%	0.02%	0.51%	0.50%	1.24%	97.71%

Share of payment instruments in digital transactions (January-May 2017)

# Re-cap: Key features of the proposed regulatory framework

- ① Capital requirement of Rs. 5 crores replaced with ongoing minimum networth requirement of Rs. 25 crores.
- ② Mandates full Know Your Customer (KYC) for all consumers of Pre-paid Payment Instruments (PPIs).
- ③ Technology-specific solutions for transaction security.

# Problems with the regulatory framework

- 1 Disproportionate networth and safeguarding requirements.
- 2 Lack of competitive neutrality between banks and non-banks.
- 3 Over-prescriptive technological requirements, but lacking in overall consumer protection.
- 4 Vague licensing process.

# A five-fold increase in capital requirements

- 1 Disproportionate to the risks that a PPI business model entails.

# A five-fold increase in capital requirements

- 1 Disproportionate to the risks that a PPI business model entails.
- 2 Inconsistent with global practices.

<b>Risk level</b>	<b>Capital adequacy</b>
Where the PPF has deposited consumers' funds in an account with no operational control	No minimum capital adequacy requirement.
In all other cases.	To be determined by the APRA on a case-by-case basis as per guidelines or 5% of total outstanding liabilities arising from consumers' deposits.

Minimum capital adequacy requirements for PPFs in Australia

- 1 Disproportionate to the risks that a PPI business entails.



# Safeguarding requirements

- 1 Disproportionate to the risks that a PPI business entails.
- 2 Inconsistent with global practices.

Country	Safeguarding requirements
Australia	Unencumbered high quality liquid assets
United Kingdom	1. Liquid, low-risk assets placed with a custodian; OR 2. Other assets coupled with an insurance policy that covers the funds.

Safeguarding requirements for PPFs in Australia and the UK

# Lack of competitive neutrality between banks and non-banks

- 1 Differentiated safeguarding requirements.

# Lack of competitive neutrality between banks and non-banks

- 1 Differentiated safeguarding requirements.
- 2 Restrictions on cross-border payments:
  - PPIs issued by non-banks can only receive specific inward personal remittances.
  - Approval process for eligibility to receive such remittances.
  - PPIs issued by banks can undertake full-fledged cross-border remittances under the authorised dealership license.

# Lack of competitive neutrality between banks and non-banks

- 1 Differentiated safeguarding requirements.
- 2 Restrictions on cross-border payments:
  - PPIs issued by non-banks can only receive specific inward personal remittances.
  - Approval process for eligibility to receive such remittances.
  - PPIs issued by banks can undertake full-fledged cross-border remittances under the authorised dealership license.
- 3 Access to core payments infrastructure.

# Operational requirements, but weak on overall consumer protection

- ① Mandatory full KYC requirements for all consumers.
  - Repetitious
  - Agnostic to risk
  - Counter-productive to the objective of financial inclusion

# Operational requirements, but weak on overall consumer protection

- 1 Mandatory full KYC requirements for all consumers.
  - Repetitious
  - Agnostic to risk
  - Counter-productive to the objective of financial inclusion
- 2 Over-prescriptive and technology-specific requirements.
  - AFA requirements.

# Operational requirements, but weak on overall consumer protection

- 1 Mandatory full KYC requirements for all consumers.
  - Repetitious
  - Agnostic to risk
  - Counter-productive to the objective of financial inclusion
- 2 Over-prescriptive and technology-specific requirements.
  - AFA requirements.
- 3 Weak on overall consumer protection mandate:
  - Transaction limits
  - PPIs given liberty to set their own transaction limits, including for fund transfer back to holder's bank account
  - Inter-operability effectively postponed.

# Problems with the licensing process

- 1 Separate licensing process *de hors* the *PSS Act*.
- 2 Screening for *prima facie* eligibility and fit and proper criteria.
- 3 Additional checks on essential aspects such as 'customer service and efficiency, technical and other related requirements'.
- 4 Grant of in-principle approval valid for six months.
- 5 Submission of system audit report by the in-principle license holder.
- 6 Additional conditions as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) may impose for the grant of a final license.



# Take-aways: Scope for rationalisation

- 1 Restore competitive neutrality between banks and non-banks.
- 2 Prescribe risk-based capital and safeguarding requirements.
- 3 Provide for a principle-based consumer protection framework.
- 4 Risk-based approach towards KYC.
- 5 Strengthen the licensing process.